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Summary findings
Network activities typically involve collecting a good or  In liberalizing the delivery of a service, policymakers
service (such as electric utilities, phone services, and rail  must consider not only efficiency but also social and
transportation)  from many producers or distributing  fiscal feasibility. Crampes and Estache discuss how
them to many users. Producers and users are often  relevant information  asymmetry is in contract design and
widely scattered, geographically. Close financial  the award and regulatory processes. They also discuss
integration  of networks is justified on the basis of  how to design pricing to accommodate the obligation to
economies of scope and scale and the benefits from  provide universal service.
pooling and coordinating. In many countries, network  To illustrate, they describe Argentina's experiment in
operators  are completely integrated publicly owned firms  liberalization, which is increasingly viewed as a model
(private firms being deemed insufficiently efficient or  for changing private sector and government involvement
equitable).  in infrastructure services. Beginning in 1989, Argentina
Challengers of this practice contend that the  began privatizing utilities and transport services, because
inefficiency resulting from lack of competition outweighs  the government had decided that it could no longer
the gain from economic integration. With reform, some  afford to subsidize those services or finance the
competitive mechanisms can be introduced even when  investments needed for their effective operation. To
monopoly seems the best option for delivering a service.  introduce competition,  the government unbundled
But conflicts between policymakers' objectives - services and introduced competitive bidding. It also
including efficiency, equity, speed, speed of reform, and  created sector-specific regulatory agencies to protect
signaling - influence the design of concession contracts  consumers from private monopolies and to protect the
for infrastructure network services (including  private concessionaires from government
communications and transportation  services).  micromanagement.
Competition begins with the unbundling of various  Making concession-based reform and contracted-
stages of delivery. Then competitive bidding is popular,  based regulation of private monopolists sustainable will
with the public authority keeping property rights on  require strengthening regulatory agencies, clarifying their
productive assets but conceding their operation to a  terms of reference and accountability, and better
private firm. The winner gets the right to maximize  separating the responsibilities of sector ministers and
profits, within limits (having to provide universal service,  regulators.
for example, and avoid price discrimination).
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1. Introduction
Network activities typically involve the collection of a good or service from a large
number of producers and/or its distribution to a large number of users. Moreover, both producers
and users are often scattered on a wide geographical area. In such industries, economies of scale
and of scope as well as benefits from pooling and coordinating are invoked to justify a close
financial integration. And since it is well recognized that huge private firms could behave in a
way that satisfies neither the economist (because of lack of efficiency) nor the non-economist
(because of lack of equity), in many countries network operators are completely integrated
publicly-owned firms. However, during the last two decades, this point of view has been
challenged by the idea that the lack of efficiency resulting from a lack of competition
overcompensates the gain from economic integration.
Competition starts with the unbundling of the various stages of the delivery process. The
type and degree of competition to introduce used to be justified by the classical trade-off between
internal and external efficiencies'. When economies of scale are not too strong with respect to the
size of the market, the risk of both types of inefficiency is weak and actual competition can be
expected to be sufficient to promote overall efficiency. This is the case for example in electricity
generation where competition can work through a free-entry rule both on the supply and demand
2 sides .Conceming now the transport and distribution activities, if the good or service needs a
continuous material infrastructure to be conveyed from one point to another (pipes, wires,
roads...), "standard" competition is very unlikely to be the first-best solution since it would imply
a multiplication of the infrastructure in the same neighborhoods. Duplication costs of the
infrastructure would offset the social benefits from the presence of a competitor. But on the other
hand, a monopoly is naturally induced to an external misallocation of resources. How can the
government solve this dilemma?
Even when a monopoly seems to be the best solution to deliver a service, competitive
mechanisms can still work. A popular approach among policy advisors in developing countries
and increasingly in OECD countries is the competitive bidding of the concession of services by
the public authority to a private monopolistic provider. The authority can keep the property rights
on the production assets and exclusively concede their operation to a private firm. The winner of
the competitive awarding mechanism obtains the right to behave as a profit-maximizer in so far
as it respects some quality and environmental qualifications and under some redistribution
obligations (for instance, universal service and no price-discrimination). As a residual claimant
Internal  efficiency  refers  to the  relative  choice  of inputs  by firms,  while  external  efficiency  refers  to their
sales  and  pricing  policies.
2 In Spain,  power  supply  is allegedly  opened  to any  producer  ... with  an authorization  from  the  Ministry  of
Energy.  On  the  demand  side  in Argentina,  access  to the  wholesale  market  is restricted  to large
customers.  But  by the  legal  definition,  the  customers  authorized  to intervene  are  less  and  less  large;
they  first  had  to buy  a capacity  larger  than  1o  MW  and,  after  successive  decreases,  the limit  was  fixed
at 100  kW  on February  1995.3
for the current  profit. the private  monopoly  has a strong  incentive  to minimize  operating  costs.
And if the bidding  process  has resulted  in an efficient  access  fee to get the concession,  the funds
collected  by the government  can be reallocated  in a way that satisfies  its distributive  objective  as
well.
But in all liberalization  processes,  efficiency  is not the only element  to be taken into
account.  Social  and fiscal feasibility  can be first  rank concerns  that will impede  the pure
economic  solution.  The paper discusses  how  concessions  contracts  for the management  of
network  services  can be allocated  and  monitored  and how trade-offs  are created  when
governments  are trying to meet too many  objectives  through  a concessioning  strategy.  Specific
examples  are given, mostly  drawn  from  the electricity  and water  industries.  In the next  section,
we present  the diversity  of the regulatory  objectives  for a government  facing  a private monopoly.
In section  3, we recall the information  asymmetries  of the government  and we explain  why  a
concession  contract  can be a second  best way to approximate  the optimal  mix of public  concerns.
Section  4 is dedicated  to the problem  of pricing  in relation  with the universal  service  obligation.
Section  5 focuses  on the risks of capture  of the regulatory  agency.  In section  6, we study  the
awarding  process  of the concession  contracts.  Finally,  in section  7, we illustrate  the preceding
economic  principles  with some  stylized  facts from  the liberalization  experiment  for the delivery
of water  and electricity  in Argentina.
2. Regulatory  mechanisms  and the diversity  of objectives
The point of view of most economists  on the regulation  of economic  activities  has
significantly  evolved  over the last three  decades. 3 The circumstances  under  which  a monopoly
can be more  efficient than  competition  are well  understood. 4 The idea of a monolithic  and
myopic  upright  ministry  perfectly  regulating  a monolithic  greedy  and non reactive  private firm
has been dropped  as well. Both the principal  (the government)  and the agent (the firm)  are now
viewed  as complex  entities  with strategic  behaviors  and using  their private  information  as scarce
valuable  resources.
On the other hand.  efficiency  concern  which is the core  of the economic  models  is often
very far from the political  plans  despite  some  apparent  convergence.  Consider  the case  of the
monopoly.  Both the economist  and  the politician  are against  private  monopolies  but for different
reasons.  The economist  does not like  monopolists  because  they do not provide  enough  good or
service  to the market,  which results  in deadweight  loss of surplus.  In this negative  judgment,  the
distribution  of surplus  between  the consumers  and the firm  does not matter at all. As for the
government,  a monopoly  is bad because  it chooses  too high prices  and so it appropriates
unacceptable  profits from consumers  who do buy from it.
3See Laffont-Tirole  ( 1993)
The monopolists  is more  efficient  for instance  to benefit  from large  scale  operations  or to internalize
environmental  damages.4
When the economist presses the firm to increase its output and the government urges the
firm to decrease its price. they seem to agree implicitly. Actually, this is only a circumstantial
convergence of their purposes and it is easy to find solutions that satisfy one of them without
satisfying the other. For instance, politicians have little trouble with a price cut without any
change in the output level. In this case, the economist disagrees since it creates a rationing
without any improvement in the social surplus. 5 On the contrary, the economist can solve the
inefficiency monopoly's curse by allowing it to fix perfect discriminating prices. Doing so, the
monopolist will produce the socially optimal level of output since it can extract the whole surplus
from consumers. But the politician will be furious against this solution on the grounds that (i)
everyone should pay the same price and (ii) it is too much in favor of the firm.
Consequently, while they do agree on the necessity to regulate monopolies, the politician
and the economist differ on how to do it. The economist will favor any solution that promotes
efficiency ... provided it is feasible. Because of this last qualification, the economist can accept
public monopolies or regulated private monopolies despite its preference for competitive
mechanisms. Symmetrically, the politician is essentially interested in the households' welfare in
so far as it conditions his\her re-election. Consequently, he\she prefers solutions that are
inexpensive for the public budget (taxpayers' concern) and that protect the social equilibrium (no
social exclusion but not too much price discrimination). Then he\she can opt for some market
solutions even if he prefers to keep some control on the operation and development of the firm.
These compromises may explain why the concession system is increasingly of interest to
researchers on the provision of public services. In a concession system, a firm is allowed to use a
part of the public assets for a given duration in network industries. The key element of the
effective regulation of this firm is the design of the contract, starting with the description of the
rights and obligations of the concessionaire. The private operators get to use public assets such as
water, air or land but at a lower political cost than pure privatization since large shares of the
population view these as assets that can only belong to the national patrimony and are happy to
see the state retain their ownership. The concession arrangement is then a useful compromise
between purely public and purely private organizations of a network industry.
The specific design of the concession system, its regulatory regime, the tariff regime or
even the way the concession is awarded reveal the priorities of the government, most obviously
the ranking of fiscal vs. static and dynamic efficiency concerns. Most reasons that motivate the
intervention of the government in a given industry are simultaneously present in a specific
regulatory process but their ranking is difficult because they represent the concerns of very
different interest groups. 6 From an economic normative viewpoint, all concerns should be
introduced in the decision process as subordinated to efficiency concerns, or at least as
'  In France,  during  the 60s and 70s, it was not uncommon  to wait for 2-3 years  before  obtaining  the
installation  of a telephone  line.
6Among  the reasons.  we can enumerate  to raise fiscal  revenue,  to promote  efficient  static and dynamic
choices,  to modify  the distribution  of income,  to increase  the quality  and safety  of products,  to protect
the environment...5
exogenous  constraints  that define  the feasible  set wherein  the most efficient  solution  will be
chosen.  In practice  however,  efficiency  is often considered  by public  authorities  as a second
order  concern  as compared  to income  distribution  and budgetary  concerns.  The following
sections  show  how  these diverse  and sometimes  antagonistic  constraints  and  objectives  interact
and can and should  influence  the design  of the payment  scheme  of the regulated  service
provider. 7
3. Rewards,  incentives and  risk-sharing
In starting  the design  of the regulatory  regime for a concessionaire,  the govenment has to
address three essential questions. It has to decide i) how much the regulated firm has to pay the
government for the use rights received through the concession, ii) how much the regulated firm
should be paid to cover the cost of providing the service (including some profit), and iii) how to
collect the money for these payments. The interactions between the answers given to these three
questions provide the basic elements of the incentive structure faced by the concessionaires for
the duration of the concession but they also determine the extent to which the participation of the
firm will be a binding constraint for the government under various levels and types of risks. For
instance, will the concessioned service package be attractive to the private sector at all, or will it
be most attractive to the best in the field? These three issues are addressed next.
Incentive constraints
The cost coverage and the net profit payment to the service provider can flow from two
sources: from the market and from any kind of public subsidy. Clearly, how the reward is
computed and the money collected will induce a strategic behavior by the firm because managers
have an informational advantage over the regulator. Since management efforts are costly, a high-
tech firm has an incentive to pretend it is less efficient. Imitating inefficient firms allows the
incumbent to avoid the disutility of management efforts. So. a subsidy or a pricing rule
exclusively based on the observation of ex post costs cannot be efficient since it would result in
the potentially productive firm performing a bad management effort. More generally, any
rewarding system that gives the firm a fixed net remuneration, such as cost-plus payment, tends
to generate poor incentives to improve upon an existing situation. This is particularly undesirable
in activities where technological improvements are significant, as in telecommunications.
The conclusion is clear from an efficiency viewpoint: the payment should be based on a
rule which allows for at least some degree of variation of the net payment with the observed ex
The  standard  optimization  approach  in public  economics  is to maximize  the  social  welfare  subject  to a
large  set of constraints:  legal,  fiscal,  technological,  informational  etc. In practice,  the regulatory
mechanisms  contain  all these concerns  without  a clear  difference  between  the statutes  of objective  or
of constraint. WVhen  several are introduced as simultaneous objectives, it can be the result of a rivalry
between several ministries. The modem approach of the regulation by multi principals analyses this
problem. See Martimort (1992).6
post cost. Among the large family of variable payments, the so-called two-part payment is
appealing by its performance and its simplicity. It combines a fixed price or transfer (to.be sure
that the firm will perform the project, as we will see later) and a variable price or transfer (to
induce it to manage the project efficiently).
But it is not sufficient for the government to propose a unique two-part payment with a
variable part based on the observed cost: doing so, the government would deprive itself of the
use of information available within the firm. For the regulatory mechanism to be efficient, the
regulator has to use all the information present in the industry: not only the cost that will be
observed ex post but also the information privately owned by the managers. How can this be
achieved? The idea is to reward the firm on the basis of the information it chooses to disclose
concerning its technology and/or demand. The reward mechanism gives the right incentives if the
firm earns higher profits when reporting the true value of its technology rather than lying.
Specifically, an efficient firm should report it is efficient and an inefficient one that it is
inefficient. In short, the optimal non linear payment must be different if one can observe ex post
low or high cost and if the firm reports low or high cost. A simple way to do that is to give the
firm a payment decreasing with its reported cost every time the observed cost is equal to the
announced one and to force it to pay very high penalties when the two costs are different.
Public subsidization,  risk sharing and participation
But this kind of incentive-based mechanism is not necessarily the most effective in
meeting the fiscal concerns of the government. Indeed, if the efficient mechanism implies that
the government has to keep on allocating significant resources to the service it concessioned, it
may not get the political support required for its implementation when the main priority of the
reforming government is to shrink the annual deficit due to subsidies given to network activities.
Indeed, when the revelation of information has a fiscal cost because of some type of explicit
subsidy, the goverm-nent  has to raise funds to finance activities it is trying to leave to the private
sector. And, as long as the government has to raise taxes, efficiency can be threatened since the
shadow price of public finds  is fairly high.
These general principles remain valid when cost can be affected by random events, i.e.
when commercial, regulatory, political or any other type of risks are involved.8 Here, we only
8 Another  extension  is when  the production  can vary  in size and/or  quality.  Then, the contract  should  be
made  contingent  on them...  provided  they are verifiable.  Because  of the information  asymmetry  on
technical  characteristics  and effort,  in the optimal  regulation  mechanism  there is an under-provision
of effort  and of quality/quantity;  so the same  will happen  in any  non linear  contract  mechanism.
Usually,  measuring  the quantity  variable  is technically  easy, but it can be very costly  to collect  exact
measures  at the individual  level when  consumption  is scattered,  like  in the water, gas or electricity
industries.  Concerning  qualitv,  when  the contract  is devoted  to the procurement  of a good  to the
government.  the civil  servants  can check  whether  or not it conforms  to admitted  standards.  It is more
difficult  to get information  on quality  when  the firm produces  a marketed  good.7
consider how the ex ante contract should be designed when the production cost is affected by
exogenous shocks. The first way to deal with these shocks is to try to anticipate them and to
write a complete contract, which means a contract depicting the rights and duties of both parties
in each conceivable state of nature. This is why for concessions,  the conditions of contracts are
usually long and precise. But a contract can never be complete, first because there are too many
imaginable contingencies (state of the technology, price of inputs, regulatory environment, etc.)
and many contingencies are unforeseeable, second because the cost of monitoring them or the
cost of getting their enforcement by a court is too high.
An incomplete contract just specifies what should be done when unforeseen events do
occur. Parties can decide to renegotiate from the very beginning or to negotiate only on the new
contingencies, to give equal bargaining powers to both parties or to concede leadership to one
party, to call for a third party arbitration, etc. For the economist, the best solution is the one that
does not discourage any effort to enhance efficiency. For instance, if the project needs some
preliminary specific investment as for most infrastructure projects, the firm should have some
leadership in the renegotiating process to prevent an under-investment that would occur if the
regulator were the one who can decide when and how to renegotiate. For the politician, this
efficiency concern is also present in so far as it can govern the continuity of the service
provision, which is a condition for the satisfaction of voters.
As a consequence of the incompleteness of contracts, the government and the firm are
facing a risky situation and this also affects the optimal choice of the regulatory mechanism. If
both are risk neutral, it does not matter who the risk bearer is. When the manager is risk adverse
while the regulator remains risk neutral, besides the cost observability problem, it will often be
optimal to transfer some or all the risks to the regulator or to the consumer giving the firm a
reward independent of the ex post observed variables.
When risk is a serious concern and the policy-makers need to rely on the private sector,
the regulatory mechanism is not only limited by incentive constraints but also by participation
constraints. Indeed, if there are some chances that ex ante and ex post costs strongly differ
depending on exogenous events uncontrolled by the concessionaire, the firm may simply not
agree to participate when penalties for non-delivery are high or when it has to take on all of the
risks by itself. This is particularly true in developing or transforming economies where relative
prices tend to change dramatically during the adjustment process and where non-commercial
risks can appear overbearing for potential entrants.
If the regulator decided to design a payment mechanism totally depending on the firm's
effort and if even with the best of efforts. the activities can only result in financial losses, no firm
would be interested, despite the social desirability of production. Often, to ensure participation,
concerns for risk will have to dominate concerns for efficiency. In other words, a cost-plus or
rate-of-return regulatory regime can be the only way to ensure that private operators are
interested in participating. But doing so. we give the firm full insurance on its remuneration and
destroy the incentive effect of a variable reward.8
Menu  of contracts and hierarchly  of concerns
The second  best strategy  for the government  is to offer  a menu  of so-called  incentive
contracts,  each composed  of a fixed  payment,  a function  of the announced  cost, and a linear
sharing  of overruns,  that is, of the difference  between  ex post  observed  costs and announced
costs. This menu approximates  the optimal  regulatory  mechanism,  which  trades  off the truthful
elicitation  of information  about productivity  (which  would  lead  to a cost plus contract)  and the ex
post inducement  of an appropriate  level of effort (which  would  lead to a fixed-price  contract).
Within  this menu, the firm will chose  the contract  that maximizes  its profit and this self-selecting
process  is optimal  since choosing  one  contract  is like revealing  internal  information.  A firm  that
expects  a large  ex post cost should  elect a low-fixed-part  and low-sharing-fraction  contract  and
symmetrically  for a firm  expecting  a low cost. 9
But one of the most policy-relevant  points is that the choice  of a regulatory  structure
depends  on the hierarchy  of concerns.  In practice,  at least four  groups  of parties  are involved:
consumers,  firms.  the government  and  the regulator.' 0 Users  worry about  prices, service  quality
and reliability.  Firms typically  worry  about  profits, risks  and market  power.  Governments,  who
are often  the dominating  player  in the context  of the reform  of the sectors  covered  here are
interested  in reducing  the fiscal burden  imposed  by the utilities  and even  are sometimes  trying  to
generate  a flow  of resources  through  the reform  process.'  I They are also concerned  with the
need  to deal with unions  as the restructuring  of these sectors  often  results in labor  redundancies.
Finally  they also have to deal with environmental  and distributional  issues.  The regulatory
agency  is motivated  by its reputation  and its members'  remuneration.
If the economist's  concern  for efficiency  were shared  by all, fixed  price contracts  would
dominate  all other forms of regulation.  But when risks  are involved,  the participation  constraint
is likely to be binding,  and social  worries  are at work,  the best solution  can be to go for some
type of cost-plus  regulation.
In practice, this could mean for instance that the firm will accept a low guaranteed return, in exchange
for a commitment by the government to take on any cost overrun for a firm expecting large ex post
costs. For the firm expecting low costs. they would accept receiving no guarantee but demand to keep
any profit, whatever its level.
I0 The regulator is ideally independent of the government. Actually, the regulatory entity as well as
regulated firms are themseives compelx organization made of individuals or groups with divergent
interests. For a recent survey see Estache and Martimort ( 1997).
In the French water industry, three large firms supply  the distribution and sanitation services to
thousands of municipalities. Clearly, absent any coordination of municipalities at the national level,
the operators are the dominant players.9
4. Prices and public service constraint
When the good or service is sold in a market, the regulatory mechanism also has to cover
pricing rules. Ideally, from an economist viewpoint, they should reflect the normative principles
mentioned earlier, but in practice, they end up covering the multiple concerns just like any other
decision on regulatory matters prepared through a political decision making process. This is why
it should come as no surprise that the best pricing policy for network industries is generally
likely to be again a variation on the theme of two-part tariffs. Indeed, the ideal (i.e. normative)
price system would have to be discriminatory because of the trade-offs imposed by the public
authority between efficiency (which commands marginal cost pricing) and all the constraints
imposed by the design chosen for the regulatory mechanism. But since the government usually
adds a constraint of no-price-discrimination, the only way out is to propose to all the consumers
an identical menu within which they choose the cheapest tariff or menu of tariffs.
The possibility to practice non linear pricing, particularly two-part tariffs, allows the
reduction of some divergence between efficiency objectives and redistribution or equity
objectives. but it creates new difficulties, particularly the risk of excluding some users. First, note
that two-part pricing can be a solution to the conflict between efficiency and budget balancing.
First best and cost recovery are no longer antagonist if the unit variable price is set equal to the
marginal cost and each consumer has to pay a fixed part equal for example to the budget deficit
divided by the number of customers. But this argument is valid only if customers are
homogeneous enough for the fixed part payment to exclude none of them from consumption.
On the contrary, with heterogeneous potential users (for instance heterogeneity in terms of
revenues). the fixed part of the tariff can be too high for small users leading to the exclusion of
some potential users.
The exclusion of a group of consumers raises two types of problems. On the one hand, its
consequences are difficult to accept on equity grounds, particularly for services such as water or
electricity. On the other hand, exclusion has negative effects even from the efficiency point of
view. Actually, as long as the excluded (poor) consumers have a marginal propensity to pay
higher than the marginal cost, their exclusion results in a welfare loss. Consequently, a tariff with
a fixed part high enough to recoup all the fixed costs can be unacceptable. One has to arbitrate
between the distortions created by an increase of the unit variable price and the negative impact
of an increase in the fixed part of the tariff. Despite this caveat, two-part tariffs remain more
efficient than Ramsey prices.  1 3 In some cases, a combination of a two-part and linear tariffs, even
if it is not a first best solution, may be welfare improving within the social constraints of
universal service. For instance. in the Belgian electricity sector, a "social tariff' without any fixed
part is reserved for very small consumption. This would suggest that the restructuring of a sector
should result in concession areas that cover homogeneous users or that the universal service
12 In some instance,  it may not be enough  to address  the fiscal issue  since  the concession  area may include
homogenous consumers who are all poor and the government may end up having to subsidize the
fixed part. It has however the advantage of increasing the transparency of the subsidy scheme.
13 Ransey prices are the most efficient linear prices when the producer has to recoup all its costs.10
obligation attached to the concession should be financed either by public subsidization  or by an
acceptable cross-subsidization.' 4
However, when universal service concerns or redistribution concerns (between rich and
poor, country and cities, firms and households...) are important to politicians but the government
is trying to minimize or eliminate any contribution to the service to address fiscal concerns, there
are new trade-offs and homogenous areas may not be the preferred option anymore. '5This ends
up influencing the optimal design of the restructuring (i.e. the concession area selected in the
unbundling process have to allow for heterogeneous consumers) but also the design of the price.
Non linear tariffs remain a good solution because they allow to generate enough revenues on the
"rich" segment to perform this redistribution. This is true without any competition but it is still
more pertinent in case of skimming of the best clients or bypass threats. Actually, if a public firm
loses its richer clients attracted by better outside offerings, it is no longer able to cross-subsidize
the poor segment and the linear price will necessarily be increased since the same fixed costs are
to be paid by a smaller number of users.
From a practical point of view, for many infrastructure services like gas, water or
electricity one can distinguish between a demand for access to production capacities and a
demand for the use of these capacities. So these two demands should be charged separately.
When a potential user wants to be connected to a network, the operator has to install a line and a
meter for which the user will pay an installation charge and a periodic subscription/maintenance
fee. This fee can be interpreted as the right to consume the good up to a certain pre-defined
maximum amount. This part of the tariff can be dependent on the capacity subscribed but it is
independent of the quantity consumed. Since the connection is the signal of a future
consumption, the operator has to develop his production capacities to meet this new demand and
the subscription charge should be equal to the cost of installing these extra capacities. After the
connection, the quantity consumed (within the limits of the subscription) is metered and each
unit should be charged at its short run marginal cost, which is essentially the cost of raw
materials and primary energy used in the production of the good. Depending on the complexity
of the measurement in place. the unit marginal price will be constant, or variable with the
quantity consumed, or time dependent, etc. The potential outstanding issue here may be that this
approach may be hard on the poor who cannot even afford the connection fee. Additional
financing mechanisms must be considered to address the combination of efficiency and equity
objectives.
Finally, when designing the regulatory regime, the reformers should remember that
upstream vertical integration can be a device for increasing the control a firm already has on its
competitors.  16  By controlling the delivery of certain strategic inputs, a firm can get a dominant
14 And this is probably  easier  with a small  "high-cost"  minority.
15 Moreover,  building  a large number  of small  homogeous  concessions  is not the best  way to benefit  from
economies  of scope.
16  For a survey  of the problems  created  by competition  in network  industries,  see Klein (1996)11
position on its final market. In network activities, the most sensible example is the control of
access to transport and distribution infrastructures by a firm that is also a user of this
infrastructure. Access to a gas pipeline or a transmission line by any generator is a key aspect of
competitive energy markets. A key instrument of this aspect of competition is the definition of
the proper rules of access pricing but it is beyond the scope of this paper.''
5. Information, institutions and the design of concession  contracts
The specific  design of a concession  contract  is  just as strongly  dependent  on the ranking
of government's  objectives  as the other  aspects  of the regulatory  scheme.  Basically,  the design  of
the contract depends on the information concerning the good or service to provide, including a
good understanding of the nature and form of demand which often changes with changes in the
regulatory arrangements, in particular the pricing rules. It also depends on the information on the
firm itself available to the regulator ex ante and ex post.
The richer the ex ante information to all parties involved, the closer to optimal planning
the contract can be. The richer the ex post information available to the regulator, the wider the set
of enforceable mechanisms that can be used to mimic the optimal planning. Consequently, the
design of contracts is totally subordinated to the ability of the government to collect valuable
economic information and to punish false reporting and deviations from contracted decisions. Its
degree of complexity should also depend on the resources the regulation agency can devote to
implement it and on the ability of the firm to understand what its interests are. Finally, the choice
of the contract should also depend on the speed with which the concession decision has to be
made. If the fiscal objective is pressing for instance, the government may not have the time to
collect the information required to come up with an efficient and equitable contract. In some
*other  cases, speed is important because signaling the commitment to reform matters more in the
short run than the reform itself. Many of the first concessions in Latin America at the end of the
1  980s and early 1  990s  illustrate this school of thought.
Whatever the explicit objectives of the concession may be, the contract should contain an
explicit list of penalties that will be incurred in case the rules are not respected.18  In a very well
tailored contract. sanctions are such that the parties do not respect the rules when and only when
it is optimal not to respect them. Too high penalties give the contract a rigidity that is inefficient.
Only credible threats should be included into the contract, which means threats that the regulator
will have an interest in implementing if a violation occurs. Non-credible threats are bad because
their presence in a contract weakens the reliability of the whole text. As the firm (rationally) does
not take them into account and as the regulator (rationally) does not punish it, the agency will get
a reputation of no-toughness that will induce the firm to "over violate" the rules or to try to
renegotiate any decision it does not like.
17 See for example  Laffont-Tirole  (1994) and  Armstrong,  Doyle  and  Vickers  (1996).
18The  economist  tries  to synthesize  them  by  the promotion  of welfare  within  the  constraints  imposed  by
the  incomsitencies  between  multiple  goals  of  the  govemment  policy.12
When the work of the regulatory commission may lead to a decrease in the firm.profits,
the firm managers have an incentive to try to "capture" the commissioners. These risks of capture
are very serious in developing countries. To prevent them, cost-plus is a good rewarding system
since it essentially sets the rent available but as shown above, it is not a very powerful source of
incentive to cut costs. Moreover, a cost-plus approach requires a monitoring of the costs which
can be manipulated by collusion between the firm managers and the agency employees in
monitoring. To prevent the regulatory staff from being influenced by the firm, a number of
institutional features should be put in place while creating the regulatory agency. For instance,
there should be restrictions on future employment of regulatory staff by regulated companies.
Also, staff salaries should be high enough to minimize the incentive for corrupt behavior. This is
the purpose of the "regulatory fee" that is now commonly added on to privatized utilities bills.
The second risk of capture of the commissioners is by consumers, or at least by some
activist minorities of consumers. It is in fact very similar to a capture by politicians in the sense
that the side payment they receive is not made in cash  (like is mostly the case for capture by the
firm) but some kind of social reward. To prevent a capture by a minority, it is generally
recommended to ensure that the commissioners should be nominated or elected for a fixed period
and protected from arbitrary removal when the regulator and the government do not see eye to
eye. In fact, the optimal design of the regulatory commission is a much more complex theme
than we make it appear here (staggering nominations of commissioners to ensure continuity,
eligibility criteria for commissioners, how to ensure the political independence of the regulators
from the political power....) but its discussion would be beyond the scope of this paper.'
From a dynamic point of view, the relation between the firm and the regulation body is a
recurring one so that the whole regulatory mechanism should take account of the forecasts of
both parties. The possibility to commit to specific decisions or to renegotiate the contract will
induce strategic behavior on both sides. As time goes by, the regulator gets information on the
behavior of the firm, on its characteristics and on potential challengers. In any information
acquiring process, postponing decisions until the deadline is efficient. Consequently, from the
regulator's viewpoint,  the ideal contract should not commit him too much and it should not be
signed for a long term. Doing so, the regulator hopes that he will be able to franchise a new firm
with a new technology or to oblige the former firm to accept a new contract, more in view with
its distributive concerns. But we know that the regulator receives also information from the firm
itself, for instance through the ex ante revelation of its cost value. So, a short term contract can
be easily interpreted by the firm as a device to extract information today in order to extract
profits tomorrow. On this basis, the firm will not disclose to the regulator all the information
necessary to implement the contract efficiently. To get full revelation of inside information, the
firm will demand a long term contract with a commitment not to renegotiate it.20
See Estache (1994, 1997) and Smith (1995)
20 A possible alternative suggested recently by a few authors would be that contracts focus on payoffs
much more than on trying to anticipate all possible physical contingencies in the contract, as13
The other argument in favor of long run contracts with hard commitments is the necessity
of sunk investments, that is of expenditures that the firm cannot recover if it does not stay long
enough in the market. A short term contract or a long term contract easily renegotiable will
systematically induce underinvestment. On the contrary, if the contract includes a reimbursement
clause of the specific investments in case of breach by the regulator before the term or in case of
a franchisee change at the term, the firm has an incentive to overinvest. Also one has to take
account of the incompleteness of contracts. The longer the term, the more incomplete the
contract is. In an industry with very intense R&D, contracts should be signed only for short
periods. In a dynamic framework, the regulation device will influence technological choices and
the investment pace. The smaller the profits allowed to the firm, the smaller the amount of its
investments. Moreover, if instead of trying to limit the firm profit, the regulation is aimed at
limiting its rate of profit, like in the former US rate-of-return regulation framework, the firm will
chose inefficiently overcapitalized production techniques. 21
Finally note that when uncertainty becomes small, reimbursing the cost to induce
efficient revelation of information becomes valueless. Only the moral hazard problem remains
relevant and under risk neutrality, the contract converges to a fixed price contract. For example
the dynamic evolution of contracts in the French weapons industry show that as a project evolves
over time, the contract resembles more and more a fixed price contract. This may be explained
by the fact that the government acquires information about the firm's cost function. In
distribution concessions where the information set of both the local authority and the
concessionaire change with time, the contract should also evolve from cost plus to price cap.
This discussion suggests that the reward of the franchisee through market sales and/or
through subsidization will be a compromise between poorly-incentive-but-secure cost-plus rules
and low-cost-inducing-but risky price-cap rules. Depending on the informational gap and on the
priority of concerns, the contract will be somewhere in between these two extremes like is
illustrated by the figure on next page.
discussed  in Maskin  and Tirole  (1997).
21 This  concern  has  to be weighted  however  against  the possibility  that  without  some sharing  of the risks
facing  potential  concessionaires,  none will be attracted.  In those cases  (and depending  on where  risks
come  from),  rate of return  regulation  allows  a risk sharing  with users  of the service  that is not as
easily  structured  under price cap regulation.14
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6. Award of the concession contract
The government can extract at least a part of the knowledge owned by the potential
concessionaires:
ex ante, by organizing a bidding procedure to allocate the concession. It is a
way to oblige competing candidates to reveal elements of their inside
information, like their profit forecast or their average cost of providing the
public service.
*  ex post, by organizing a yardstick competition based for instance on ex post
costs if they are publicly known. 22
The three basic methods for allocating a concession are administrative decisions, lotteries
and auctions. They differ in terms of speed, transaction costs, efficiency, equity and fiscal
payoffs and hence impose new choices among trade-offs. In the administrative process, a
commission holds comparative hearings to decide which applicant is the most worthy. When
there are many markets to concede, this "beauty contest" method breaks down under its
heaviness because there can remain a big backlog of unassigned licenses. With lotteries, the
method changes drastically, each market being assigned randomly among the applicants.
Lotteries are very good for assigning concessions quickly but the winners are not necessarily the
best candidates in terms of their ability to operate the markets, consequently they are not
necessarily the ones who want to pay the highest concession fees. An auction offers two
advantages over the former alternatives: it can raise revenue, which is good for the seller, but it
can also be designed to identify the firms with the highest use-values for the market to be
conceded, which is good for efficiency. But this again implies trade-offs which have been
assessed in other contexts. 23
Auctions are just a way to organize competition in certain circumstances where there are
not too many potential buyers and where the seller thinks he will be better off under this kind of
"collective bargaining" than under any succession of bilateral bargaining rounds. Many
exchanges are performed under auctioning. For each item, the main variables that can deternine
22 To organize  yardstick  competition,  one needs  several identical  activities  operated  by different  firms (for
instance local telephone in separated regions) and the differences that are observed between the
performances of these firms are to be attributed to moral hazard variables, that is to the unobservable
decisions of the agents. The regulator can promote efficient (while non observable) decisions within
the firmns  making  the net revenue  of each firm a decreasing  function  of its own  cost (which  is an
incentive to decrease it) and an increasing value of the average cost in the other firms.
23 It has become  standard  to distinguish  four primary  types of auctions  which  can be used either in single
object or multiple unit auctions: English and Dutch auctions which are open oral procedures on the
one hand and first-price and second-price auctions which are sealed-bids procedures on the other
hand. See for instance McAfee and McMillan (1987)16
the choice among trade-offs are based on three elements that need to be determined by the
auction: How is the winner selected? and How much and how does he/she have to pay?24  On the
basis of the answers to these questions, one has to give a valuation of the different institutional
rules governing the exchange and these rules are important because they can affect bidding
incentives and therefore the terms and efficiency of the exchange.
In practice the bidding process generally starts with some type of prequalification of
potential bidders based on technical and financial criteria. This process reduces the number of
bidders, which is bad for competition, but it also reduces the risks of non-compliance by
unreliable bidders. It is yet another way of revealing information for the regulator. The next
relevant institutional feature is the way in which the winner is selected. Here also, there are many
options. Until recently it was common to rate various aspects of the technical and financial
proposal and add up the results in a weighted or unweighted average. This process lacks the
transparency and hence the efficiency that many potential bidders would like to see. So the two
most common options in the award concession contracts boil down to this: (i) the winner is the
highest payer for the right to provide the service or (ii) the winner is the bidder offering the
lowest price to be paid by the consumers (in both cases for a set level of investment and quality
requirements). 25 The first criteria favors the fiscal objectives and aims at maximizing the revenue
to the government (this is the model typically analyzed by the literature on auctions). The
payments are typically made as a lump sum at the beginning of the concession period or as an
annual payment (which often boils down to a rental fee for the use of the existing infrastructure
made available by the government). The second model focuses on the interest of users and ensure
price minimization rather than revenue maximization.
These two options are typically not equivalent in net present value terms. Even if they
were designed to be equivalent, their equivalence would depend on a number of unrealistic
assumptions, not the least the effectiveness of the regulator in controlling the concessionaires'
efforts to give the various opportunities shifts in demand and supply over time to generate short
term rents. Moreover, the concession agreements tend to be dynamic, the payment agreed under
the first type of decision rule is seldom renegotiated while the average tariff is often renegotiated
in such a way that the concessionaire ends up with a larger share of the rent created by the
efficiency gains achieved by the monopolist concessionaire. One of the advantages of the second
model is that it allows faster decisions. Under the first model, the government needs to come up
with a minimum payment or a reservation price if it wants to avoid the risk of having to
24 Note that in an auction,  the bids are not necessarily  the price that  the winner  will pay to the seller.  It can
be any characteristics  of the exchange  as far as it can be measured  and verified:  quantity  to produce,
sale price,  quality  of service  etc. Argentina's  1993  cellular  license  auction  illustrates  the variety  of
public  policy  purposes  to which  auctions  can be dedicated.  Competition  was not over  price but over
which  bidder could offer to set up cellular  telephone  service  in the fastest  time.  A consortium
including  GTE and AT&T  won by promising  to provide  cellular  service  across  a vast  area of
Argentina's  countryside  in only  one month.  For the water concession  of Buenos  Aires in April 1993,
the candidates  had to compete  by proposing  a discount  coefficient  to multiply  the computed  "public
tariffs'.
25  Williamson  (1985).  chapter 1317
subsidize the service. When the value of the assets involved is poorly known (as is typically the
case for water companies for which most of the assets are underground), it can take quite a bit of
time to come up with a reasonable reservation price. The slowness of this process is not
necessarily consistent with the need for the concession to take place quickly to make the most of
the political momentum. In sum, the tradeoffs are between revenue, users' well being and
timeliness.
The linkages between auction design and objectives are not the only sources of
complexity. Another is the risks of cooperation between participants to the procedure. The first
possibility is a collusion between buyers to limit the price to be paid by the winner. This type of
misconduct is most probable in oral auctions (because the "cartel" members can watch each
other) and in repeated auction (the bidders can decide who will gain each item in his turn). The
second possibility is a capture of the auctioneer. He can be captured by the seller when the
commissioner misreports the quality of the goods; a consumer with a true valuation less than the
seller's valuation will tender too high a bid and win the auction, which results in an inefficient
allocation. On the contrary, the commissioner can be captured by a (group of) buyer(s) which
results in a too low sale price as compared with the predictable price in a fair auction. These
different misconducts can be limited if the procedure is widely public and if the participants are
numerous. Note that the collusion may be stimulated by the design of the auctions. If the
government imposes an upper limit of the shares anyone bidder can own of the deal, it is very
likely that various bidders will have a strong incentive to collude. In Brazil's railways
concessions for instance, no single operator could own more than 20% of the shares. There were
never more than 6 or 7 potential candidates to the concessions so that it was clear that they had a
strong incentive to create consortia together and to figure out how to share profits after winning
the bid as a single candidate. Similar issues can arise when the government is trying to impose
redistributive criteria on the design of the auction by requiring the participation of minority
owned or locally owned firms as part of international consortia.
The final design of an auction procedure should take account of the quantity of
information the auctioneer wants to give to candidates. For a unique concession assignment, the
more the candidates know about each other, the greater the chances the prize to be attributed to
the highest valuation bidder. On the other hand, in a multiple-round auction, with a good
knowledge of other's valuation, candidates can collude to organize alternate assignments of
prizes. If there are several items to allocate, like the concessions for electricity distribution or
various segments of highways, the decision to auction the concessions in sequence rather than in
a large simultaneous auction depends on a delicate trade-off. On the one hand, a sequence of
elementary auctions has the advantages of administrative simplicity and of instantaneous plan
revision: at the end of each sale, every bidder knows exactly what everybody got and what
remains to sell. But on the other hand, predatory bidding and other problems can occur.
McMillan shows that many of these drawbacks can be avoided using large simultaneous auctions
or, to keep some of the advantages of sequencing, a simultaneous auction but with multiple
rounds. In this case, the problem is to define clear stopping rules: the auction should last a finite
time easy to compute and with aggregation possibilities until the deadline. For instance, one can
decide that after a certain duration only active bidders can still offer new bids and/or that the
increment to announce for winning the prize is a decreasing function of the number of active18
bidders.26
7.  Lessons from the implementation of these principles in Argentina's recent privatization
Argentina is increasingly viewed as a model of what private sector involvement in
infrastructure services represents for a developing country not only in terms of changes in the
way the services are being delivered but also in terms of the new role of the government in these
sectors. Beginning in 1989, Argentina committed itself to a wide-ranging privatization program
covering utilities and transport services under the National government authority. The initial
objective was fiscal: the government had decided that it could no longer afford to subsidize these
services nor finance the investments required to ensure their proper operation.27  But in the
process the government also tried to improve the efficiency with which these services were being
delivered. This entailed a major restructuring of each sector and the development of a regulatory
capacity which has proven to be one of the main challenges of the reforms.
The main objective of the restructuring was to introduce competitive forces wherever
possible. Competition requires multiple players and one way to increase the number of players
was to unbundle services wherever possible. In electricity and gas, the vertical and horizontal
separation of generation. transmission and supply had been considered a sine qua non condition
to the creation of effective competition in the sector. Horizontal unbundling was the key to the
restructuring of telecommunications, with the division of the public enterprise into two
companies getting each roughly half of the country and with the separation of activities into three
service groups, basic telephony (infrastructure and local phone services), international services
(international calls, telex and data) and services in competition (national telex, national data,
maritime radio ....). The division of the national rail company into three separate businesses,
freight, intercity passenger and commuter rail--which were privatized or transferred to the
provinces was instrumental to the major restructuring of this sector as well. Intercity passenger
services were ultimately abandoned and freight and passenger services were themselves divided
into separate lines (six for freight and seven for commuters) before offered in concession to the
private sector. Argentina's main container port was also divided into its terminals which were
awarded to five different concessionaires.
To maximize the benefits from competition in each sector, competitive bidding was the
standard way of passing on the service to private operators, although every sector adopted a
26 MacMillan  (1994) and more  recently  Cramton  (1997)
27 In transport, whatever could not be privatized was to be decentralized and it became up to the provinces
to decide what to do with costly infrastructure services. The decentralization of rail and ports unfit to
rapid privatization by the National government lead to the abandon of many low traffic services for
instance. As for water and electricity distribution, they were provincial responsibilities to begin with
and not all provinces have followed the lead of the national government in getting the private sector
involved so that public and private enterprises are coexisting in these two sectors.19
somewhat  different  bidding  approach.28  An elaborate  system  of weighted  criteria  was used  to
select  the winners  for the freight  rail concessions  while  winners  for the first  round of road
concessions  were selected  simply  on the amount  of the fee to be paid  to the government.  The
designers  of the electricity  sector  introduced  a sophisticated  system  of management  period which
maintained  the competitive  pressure  on the initial  winners  of the distribution  and  transmission
concessions.  This approach  revealed  the strong  concern  for the sustainability  of the efficiency
gains  of the electricity  reformers,  in addition  to the fiscal  objectives. As for water,  where  the
bidding  process  was the main way of introducing  competition  in the sector  and hence critical  to
the success  of the reform,  the procedure  involved  multiple  stages,  including  a prequalification,  a
technical  qualification  focusing  (some  would  argue excessively)  on the way the bidders were
proposing  to meet quality and investment  targets  and a final  stage  in which  the financial  proposal
for the lowest  tariff was to be the decisive  stage. 29
Overall,  however,  the design  of the bidding  processes  clearly  revealed  that the fiscal
concerns  of the government  where  tainting  the search for efficiency  through  the bidding  process.
The search  for a minimum  price for the consumers  was only obvious  for the water  sector and the
access  roads  to Buenos  Aires.  In all other cases,  the award  criteria  was centered  around  some
form of payment  to the government  (cash  or debt  reduction)  or the minimization  of subsidy
requirements.  As for the effectiveness  of the bidding  procedures  in enhancing  competition,  the
results  were at best mixed:  while many  bidding  documents  were sold, several  buyers  of these
documents  ended merging  so that there were seldom  many  bidders  for each  transaction  (i.e. 2 and
3 for telecoms,  between 1 and 5 for the electricity  distribution  and transmission  companies,
between  2 and 8 for the gas distribution  and transmission  companies,  4 for the water company,  1
or 2 for the freight  railways).
While  the unbundling  and competitive  bidding  procedures  were certainly  important  to
introduce  some  of the benefits  of competition  in the delivery  of infrastructure  services  in
Argentina,  the government  was very aware  of the need for continuous  direct regulation  of these
industries  since  once the concessions  were awarded,  many  of these  were essentially  local private
monopolies.  This is why each  sectoral  restructuring  was accompanied  by the creation  of a sector
specific  regulatorv  agency.  To some  extent,  the creation  of every  agency  were supposed  to
recognize  the main reasons for the creation  of a regulatory  agency:  (i) the monitoring  of
compliance  with the contractual  obligations  of the concessionaires  (ii) consumers  need  to be
protected  from the private monopolies,  (iii) the private  concessionaire  needs  to be protected  from
the government  who still can be tempted  of interfering  with the private  concessionaires'
management.  But once more, the specific  approach  adopted  by each  sector was quite different.
28 The terms  of these concessions  vary significantly:  7 year exclusive  licenses  for telecoms.  95 years for
electricity  distribution  and transmission,  35 years for gas, 12  years for intercity  roads,  an average  of
about  23 years for BA.  access  roads,  30 years for freight  rail and 10  years for commuter  rail (20 years
for the metro)
29  See Crampes  and Estache  (  1996)20
While the creation and staffing of the electricity and gas regulatory agencies followed the
international best practice and not yet had major problems in fulfilling their obligations, the
experience of the other regulatory agencies or authorities has been much more tense. The most
problematic may have been the telecoms and water regulators where there are not only staffing
problems (skill mix and excessive numbers) and data problems (not enough information  to assess
costs) but also concerns with the lack of transparency of the decision making process. As for
transport regulators, who have recently been merged into a single regulatory agency, the main
issue has been the lack of independence from the political power. Unfortunately, there is some
concern with the fact that the division of responsibilities between the regulators and their sector
ministries and secretaries is increasingly being blurred for all sectors, reducing the independence
of most regulators and in the process their accountability as regulators. There is also some
concern that the statutory framework under which these regulators operate do not really address
the need to protect would-be competitors and granted equality of access to essential facilities to
ensure that competitive pressure remains in the sector. Without this responsibility and without
the tools (including access rules and pricing options), the regulatory agencies are unlikely to be
filling their role in the promotion of competition in infrastructure services.
In sum, Argentina's experience demonstrates that while a tremendous transformation of
the way in which infrastructure services are being delivered can be achieved quickly and fairly
successfully through concessions, the long run sustainability of the short term achievements is
not guaranteed. The preference for speed of reform and fiscal concerns and the nervousness
about the risks of not being able to attract private investors have generally dominated the design
of the concessioning processes as in water and telecoms for instance. This is why information
gaps for the regulators are still quite significant for most concessions and information generation
processes are still being developed sometimes over 5 years after the private sector took over.
This is also one of the key reasons why the sustainability of the concession based reforms and of
the regulation of private monopolists through contracts will depend on the strengthening of the
regulatory agencies, on the clarification of some of their terms of references and of their
accountability and on better separation of the responsibilities of the sector ministries and of the
regulators...  .and this may be the main lesson for countries considering to follow Argentina's
footsteps.21
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